The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: How They Affect Product Liability Practice by Mitchell, Caroline
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 12 Number 3 Article 10 
1974 
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: How They Affect Product 
Liability Practice, The 
Caroline Mitchell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Caroline Mitchell, Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: How They Affect Product Liability Practice, The, 12 
Duq. L. Rev. 551 (1974). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol12/iss3/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence:
How They Affect Product Liability Practicet
Caroline Mitchell*
I. GATHERING THE DRIFTWOOD: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The legal community has long registered its discontent regarding the
state of evidence practice within the federal court system.1 No formal
body of federal evidence law existed. Each circuit applied the evidence
law, comprising a mass of doctrines, statutes and case decisions, of the
state wherein the federal court happened to be sitting.2 The result was
that evidentiary decisions within a given circuit were at the least non-
uniform and occasionally seemed unfounded or conflicting.3
Assuming, arguendo, that the critiques were valid and a reformation
of the rules of evidence was advisable, to which body should the task be
assigned? Much had previously been written in support of accelerating
the efforts of courts as vehicles for the formulation of new law.4 But
courts generally were reluctant to take upon themselves what rightly
appeared to be the enormous task of revising the whole of federal evi-
dence practice. The Supreme Court itself was not willing to remold the
law of evidence in the few cases before it which turned on evidentiary
t This article was written under the auspices of a study sponsored by the National
Science Foundation from a grant (NSF Grant No. GI-34857) to Carnegie-Mellon University;
this study is entitled "Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology."
0 B.S. Ch. E., University of Pittsburgh, 1968; J.D., Duquesne University School of Law,
1973; Member of the Pennsylvania Bar; Research Associate, Carnegie-Mellon University.
1. See generally REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,
63 A.B.A. REP. 570, 576 (1938). "To put it another way, the Law of Evidence is now where
the law of forms of action and common law pleadings was in the early part of the 19th
century." Morgan, Foreword to THE MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 5 (1942). "The law of
Evidence in our federal courts is in most deplorable condition. It is inferior to that of any
of the states, and not only inferior but far inferior.... This state of things is unworthy of
Federal practice. It ought no longer to be tolerated . Wigmore, A Critique of the
Federal Court Rules Draft, 22 A.B.A.J. 811, 813 (1936).
2. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. See THE SECTION OF JuDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A.B.A. 73 (Handbook, 1961).
4. See generally Bohlen, The Reality of What the Courts are Doing, in LEGAL ESSAYS
(1935); Pound, The Rule Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926); Warner, The
Role of Courts and Judicial Councils in Procedural Reform, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 447
(1937). Indeed, J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw (1898),
pointed out the special qualifications of judges to dispel the confusion prevalent in
evidentiary practice by formulating "rules of court." Id. at 534.
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issues, recognizing perhaps that the modernization of the rules of evi-
dence in the federal system was a formidable task best suited to a body
whose entire time and energy could be completely devoted thereto.5
The Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference, whose responsibility it was to draft rules of civil
procedure for federal courts, could conceivably include a section on fed-
eral evidence practice in the rules. The extent to which the rules
addressed evidentiary matters was dependent upon an answer to the
question of whether evidence law was to be considered "substantive"
or "procedural." If evidence practices were "procedural," the Advisory
Committee's codification of rules of practice and procedure for the fed-
eral courts could certainly include a section on federal evidence which
hopefully would modernize, clarify, and codify existing federal evi-
dentiary practice. If evidence was a matter of substantive law, however,
the federal courts would have to continue to apply the evidence law of
the forum state under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.6
The Advisory Committee's procedural responsibilities would not in-
clude an evidence section, no matter how sorely it was felt to be needed.
Members of the original Advisory Committee later disclosed the hesita-
tion with which the proposal to include evidence in the rules of pro-
cedure was greeted. Their hesitation may have been due in part to
uncertainty over the role of the courts, if any, in the reformulation, and
in part to a recognition of the enormity of the task confronting those
who chose to begin the work.7 The original Advisory Committee even-
tually concluded that the matter of evidence in general was within the
rule making power and that of necessity it must deal with the subject
to some extent.8
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as adopted by Congress, did
not modernize federal evidence as they did federal pleading and prac-
tice. Although a complete compendium of federal evidence law had
been suggested, the only rule dealing directly with evidentiary matters
was rule 43.9
5. "We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the profession that
much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations ....
To pull one misshapen stone out the grotesque structure [of Federal evidence law] is more
likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a
rational edifice." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. Mitchell, Attitude of the Advisery Committee, 22 A.B.A.J. 780 (1936); PROCEEDINCS
OF THE CLEVELAND INTUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 185-86 (1938).
8. 5 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PacancE 837-38 (2d ed. 1971).
9. For an extensive discussion of rule 43, exploring the impact of the rule in evidence
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Rule 43(a) specifies very generally the standards for admissibility of
evidence in federal courts. The rule, as formulated, is a liberal one
greatly favoring admissibility. Evidence is admissible "if it would be
admissible (1) under a United States Statute ... or (2) under a rule as
applied previously by Federal courts in the state in which the Federal
Court is sitting .. .. *"10 This last subsection of the rule thus formally
provides for application of state rules of evidence to determine admis-
sibility questions in the federal court system.
Rule 43(a) was acclaimed by some as a workable, efficient tool that
has had decisive influence in admitting that which would otherwise be
excluded.1 Rule 43(a) has also been widely criticized 2 as a "hodge-
podge,"'1 a "freak among the Rules, '14 a mere "stop-gap measure"
which did little or nothing to abrogate the problem of evidentiary non-
uniformity within a circuit. Although the criticisms had been wide-
spread and it seemed apparent that such points were well-taken, the
reform of the federal rules of evidence was to be a slow process. Even
though the criticisms leveled at the system of evidence were at least
as piercing as Jeremy Bentham's vitriols on the state of common-law
procedure,1 5 they seemingly had failed to "lash the community into a
sense of its shortcomings" as Bentham's had done.' 6 The inefficacy of
rule 43(a) alone in effectuating the desired codification in the law of
admissibility reemphasized the need for a set of federal rules of evi-
dence apart from the efforts of the drafters of the rules of civil procedure
in that regard.
The remaining sections of rule 43 also seemed to fall into the classifi-
practice, see Green, Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rules, 55 HARV. L. REV.
197 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Admissability]; Green, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(A),
5 VAND. L REV. 560 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Green]. Professor Green was later to become
a member of, and reporter to, that committee of the Judicial Conference entrusted with
codification of the new Federal Rules of Evidence.
10. FEn. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
11. Clark, Foreward to Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 10 RuTrcms L.
REV. 479 (1956); Note, The Admissibility of Evidence under Rule 43(a), 48 VA. L REV.
939 (1962).
12. Admissibility, supra note 9, at 225. "The Federal Rules of Civil procedure have
failed to supply the U.S. Courts' peculiar need for certainty in the law of Evidence, and
they have equally failed to furnish the simplification and liberality which are needs
in the law of evidence generally .... [A]dequate improvement can only come through
legislation, preferably through Rules of Court .... " Id.
13. Joiner, Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts, 20 F.R.D. 429, 436 (1958).
14. Green, supra note 9, notes its attributes as follows: undearness as to meaning (id.
at 578), failure as a modernizing device (id at 562), incompleteness as a scheme (id. at 563),
lack of progress toward a uniform system for federal courts (id. at 579-80).
15. J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (J. Mill ed. 1827).
16. "No one can say how long our law might have waited for regeneration, if Bentham's
diatribes had not lashed the community into a sense of its shortcomings." 1 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 8, at 239 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
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cation of stop-gaps. Rule 43(b) merely codified the rule followed in the
majority of states that the scope of cross-examination was to be limited
to the scope of the direct. This section of the rule also embraced the
current state practice providing for leading questions to unwilling or
hostile witnesses and contradiction or impeachment of adverse parties.
Rule 43(c) reiterated concerns for the preservation on the record of
excluded evidence and offers of proof directed thereto.
Taken as a whole, the three provisions of rule 43 neither constituted
nor were intended to constitute the detailed collection of rules on fed-
eral evidence thought to be necessary. 17 Requests for a definitive
compilation of federal evidentiary practices continued to come from
many areas, among them committees of several circuit judicial con-
ferences, a committee of the American Bar Association, and many
eminent judicial authors.' 8 In 1961, The Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States submitted its proposal on reform of the rules of evidence for
federal courts. Accordingly, a special committee on the feasibility and
desirability of uniform rules of evidence was established. Its documented
study was released for comment in December 1961 and in 1965 the
permanent Advisory Committee was established.
The preliminary report of the Special Committee was much in favor
of launching an attempt to modernize evidence practice, and the proper
vehicle for the modernization was suggested to be a special advisory
committee of the Judicial Conference. The previous inactivity of the
courts as law makers in the area of evidentiary reform dissuaded the
committee from assigning any part of the authority to them. "The re-
luctance of the Supreme Court to improve evidence rules by decision is
matched by the inability of lower courts to show progress toward modern
evidence law .... "19
17. The Advisory Committee again deliberately declined to expand rule 43 to be the
compendium thought to be needed in its formulation of the amendments of 1946 to become
effective in 1948. "While consideration of a comprehensive and detailed set of rules of
evidence seems very desirable, it has not been feasible for the Committee so far to undertake
this important task." See note 7 supra.
18. See generally Degnan, The Feasibility o Rules of Evidence for Federal Courts, 24
F.R.D. 341 (1960); Estes, The Need for Uniform Rules of Evidence in the Federal Courts,
24 F.R.D. 331 (1960); Ladd, Uniform Evidence Rules in Federal Courts, 49 VA. L. REV. 692
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Ladd]; Orfield, Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 67 DIcK.
L. REV. 381 (1962); A Discussion before the Judicial Conference, 48 F.R.D. 39 (1969).
19. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOP-
ING UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIsTRIct COURTS, 30 F.R.D. 73, 99
(1962).
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II. PROPOSED FEDERAL EVIDENCE LAW: THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE
In March 1969, the Advisory Committee submitted its preliminary
draft of the proposed rules of evidence to the Judicial Conference. After
extensive discussion and comments by the bench and the bar, the draft
was modified and re-submitted to the Judicial Conference. The Federal
Rules of Evidence were approved by the Judicial Conference of the
United States in October 1971 and forwarded to the Supreme Court in
November of that year. An order of the Court transferred the rules to
Congress,20 and in the absence of its disapproval, the Federal Rules of
Evidence were to have become effective automatically in July of 1973.
Much controversy existed over the sometimes-radical departures from
current evidentiary practice mandated by the new rules. A bill requir-
ing the affirmative consent of Congress for enactment of the proposed
rules was passed by the Senate and was approved by the President in
March of 1973.21 As of November 1973, no such affirmative action to
approve enactment has been taken.
The Federal Rules of Evidence as proposed 22 will expressly supplant
much of the existing federal evidence law as currently contained in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.23 The new federal rules are to govern
all matters of evidence in federal courts and before federal magistrates,
including admiralty, maritime, and bankruptcy cases. Changes to the
current federal system include the implicit repeal of all of rule 43(a)
and (b) and part of rule 43(c). Rule 32(c), regulating when the taking
of a deposition made the deponent one's own witness and hence un-
impeachable, is expressly abrogated by the directives of Federal Rules
of Evidence 601 and 607. Amendments are proposed to rules 30(c) and
44.1 of civil procedure and rules 26, 26.1 and 28 of criminal procedure.
An entirely new section, article VII, dealing with opinion and expert
20. For insight into the mechanism whereby the Supreme Court prescribes rules of evi-
dence to be enacted by Congress, see Degnan, The Law of Federa[Evidence Reform, 76
HARv. L. REv. 275 (1962); Ladd, supra note 18, at 692.
21. S. 583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See Congressional Discretion in Dealing with
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 U. MIcH. J.L RFY. 798 (1973).
22. The text of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence may be found in 51 F.R.D.
315 (1971).
23. See generally Green, Highlights of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 4
GEORGIA L. REv. 1 (1965); Powell, A Discussion of the New Federal Rules of Evidence, 8
GONZAGA L. REv. 1 (1972); Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An Intro-
duction and Critique, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 449 (1969); Symposium on the Federal Rulei of
Evidence, 10 Ru1trEns L. REv. 485 (1956); Symposium on the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1061 (1969).
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testimony, has been added. The Federal Rules of Evidence contain
certain provisos which contradict in major part the state rules of evi-
dence currently followed by district courts as lex fori. Changes are
proposed in areas such as the scope of cross-examination, 4 state privilege
for exclusionary purposes25 (one of the most controversial provisions),
impeachment of a witness by a calling party and admissibility of opin-
ion testimony.2 6
The current controversy in Congress over adoption of the rules cen-
ters mainly about those provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence
which drastically alter current federal and state evidentiary practice.
The changes proposed by the Federal Rules of Evidence are of particu-
lar interest to those involved in products liability work, due to the
suggestions of the new article VII, which is entirely devoted to opinion
and expert testimony. This article will analyze the effect of the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence on federal trial practice, particularly with
respect to products liability litigation.
III. THE FEDERAL RuLEs AND TRuL PRAcTicE
A. Scope of Cross-Examination
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b) defines the scope of cross-
examination as limited to "an examination only upon the subject
matter of the examination in chief" (with the exception of cross-
examination to impeach). In addition to its being the federal rule,27
limited cross-examination is the rule in the majority of states. 28
The original drafting of the federal rule as a limited-scope cross-
examination (the "American Rule") had been attacked by a number of
commentators, most prominent among them Dean Wigmore. Wigmore's
criticisms of the American rule are three in number:
24. Scope of cross-examination and admissibility of opinion testimony are covered ex-
tensively at pp. 556-62 infra of the within article.
25. For surveys of state privilege in federal courts today, see Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privilege in Federal Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101 (1956);
Pugh, Rule 43(a) and Communications Privileged under State Law: An Analysis of Con-
fusion, 7 VAND. L. REv. 556 (1954); Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical
Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv. 175 (1960).
26. See note 24 supra.
27. Originally, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had
proposed "cross-examination as to all matters material to every issue in the case in chief."
This expanded rule was subsequently amended to the current limited scope adopted above
by the federal rules.
28. C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1954) [hereafter cited as MCCORMICK]; 3 WIG-
MORE, supra note 16, § 1885.
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1) it requires either an impossible feat of memory or a constant
perusal of a stenographic report to ascertain as to each question
asked on cross, whether or not it is within the scope of direct; 2) it
permits a party to call a friendly witness, elicit only the facts favor-
able to the calling party, and then compel the opponent to call the
hostile witness as his own to get the rest of the facts; 3) it hampers
the cross-examiner subjectively, because should he step beyond the
limits set by direct, the witness becomes his own. And of course,
any invasion by the cross-examiner into territory not covered on
direct can be stricken from the record or held reversible error.2 9
The proposed federal rule of evidence dealing with scope of cross-
examination, rule 611 (c), provides: "A witness may be cross-examined
on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.
In the interest of justice, the judge may limit cross-examination regard-
ing matters not testified to on direct.130
Thus, the proposed rule in federal trials adopts the traditional wide-
open cross-examination currently allowed in twelve of the states, subject
only to the court's discretionary power to limit the inquiry. The cross-
examiner theoretically is free to question the witness about any subject
so long as it relates in some way "to any issue" in the case, including the
examiner's affirmative defenses. While the rule does not specifically state
that this most liberal scope should be implied to exist, which permits a
cross-examination extending to the cross-examiner's own affirmative
defenses or cross claims in addition to matters brought out on direct,
affirmative defenses or cross claims are certainly "related to" issues in
the case as required by the rule. Limiting cross-examination to exclude
an investigation of such defenses would seem to be more properly a
matter for judicial discretion in exceptional instances rather than the
prevailing practice in all cases. As cross-examination "as to all matters
pertinent to the issue on trial with the exception of matters relating to
distinct grounds of defense or avoidance" is the rule today in only one
or two states,3 1 it seems safer to construe rule 611 (c) as permitting the
wide-open unlimited cross-examination suggested above.
The products liability trial often is distillable into a conflict between
two diametrically opposed analyses of one and the same technological
issue. A refutation of the opponent's scientific theory coupled with the
29. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 1888.
30. See note 22 supra.
31. B. JoNES, COMMENTARIES ON EVMENCE § 2342 (2d ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as
JONES]. Ohio seems to be the only state retaining this rule to date. Dietsch v. Mayberry, 70
Ohio App. 527, 47 N.E.2d 404 (1942).
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establishment of a plausible scientific theory of one's own is essential
to success at trial. Under the proposed federal rules, the attorney will
be permitted to cross-examine the expert not only on the foundations
for his own scientific conclusions as advocated on direct, but also the
expert's analysis of the theories advanced by opposing experts as de-
fenses. The use of such expanded scope of investigation into the thought
processes by which the expert arrives at his own theory and, more
importantly, discards the theory of his opponent, should better equip
the jury to factually resolve scientifically-based conflict of technological
issues in the case. To be sure, the investigation on cross of not only the
previous direct but also all other relevant issues, including affirmative
defenses, creates an opportunity for testimonial confusion and chaos
presently unparralleled in today's practice. But the thoughtful use of
the above opportunity by skilled counsel to elicit from each expert on
cross the information relevant to both viewpoints on a given issue in
the case, in an orderly and logical sequence, can add immeasureably to
the jury's understanding of those issues. The practical possibility that
cross-examiners under the new rule may ask an expert not only to defend
his own position but also to give his reasons for rejecting his opponent's
may make the expert more thorough and open minded in the formula-
tion of his opinion for trial.
B. Opinion Testimony by the Lay Witness: Federal Rule 701
The traditional rule with respect to opinion testimony by lay wit-
nesses holds that with few exceptions, an opinion, conclusion, or infer-
ence based on facts in issue is incompetent. Where the subject matter is
of common knowledge or experience, a recitation of facts will enable
the jury to form its own opinion on the matter, and an opinion by a
lay witness serves only to interfere with the jury's decision-making pro-
cess. 82 Accordingly, testimony must be confined to statements of concrete
"facts" within the witness's own observation, knowledge and recollec-
tion. This "rule against opinions" excludes opinions or inferences by
witnesses not testifying in some expert capacity as incompetent and
inadmissible.
The differentiation between "fact" and "opinion," upon which ad-
missibility hinges, is at best a difficult classification problem for the trial
32. JONEs, supra note 31, §§ 1241-1575; 7 WiGMOR, supra note 16, § 1917. See cases noted
in Annot., 66 A.L.R. 2d 1051 § 3 (1959); Annot., 90 A.LR. 749 (1933).
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judge. The difference between fact and opinion, as McCormick notes
in his treatise, "is merely a difference between a more concrete and
specific form of descriptive statement and a less specific and concrete
form .... The difference between fact and opinion is no difference
between opposites and contrasting absolutes, but a mere difference in
degree with no line to mark the boundary.... ,,33
A recognition of the difficulty of the latter assessment, coupled with
the necessity of admitting opinion where it is the only testimony avail-
able, has led to more lenient standards of admissibility for relevant
opinion evidence. Actual practice has formulated several exceptions to
the rule against opinions: in circumstances where the opinion is but a
shorthand expression of a complex set of facts, and recitation of the
complete factual situation would be unduly burdensome or time-con-
suming, the opinion is admissible under the "collective facts" exception
to the opinion rule.8 4 In circumstances where a witness's conclusions or
opinions are found to be reasonably grounded and non-prejudicial to
the rights of any given party, it is well within the "administrative dis-
cretion" of the court to permit such testimony to be received in the
case.8 5
The rule against opinions may better be described as a "rule of pref-
erence" rather than a rule of exclusion. The former formulation rec-
ognizes the element of necessity and judicial discretion in the final
determination of admissibility. The court may well think it wise, after
listening to a witness, to elucidate from him the primary facts upon
which his opinion rests. In other cases, the court may prefer to save
judicial time at no expense to the parties by allowing an opinion repre-
senting only a collection of facts into evidence with no further founda-
tion.
Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, suggests an even more liberal
formulation of the rule: "the opinion should be rejected only when
superfluous in the sense that it is of no probative value to the jury."86
The test of probative value to the jury is also the limitation proposed
by the Uniform Rule of Evidence:
(1) If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions or
33. McCormick, supra note 28, § 11, at 22. See generally McCormick, Some Observations
on Opinion Testimony and Expert Testimony, 23 TEx. L. R-v. 109 (1945); Tyree, The
Opinion Rule, 10 RUTGERs L. REV. 601 (1956).
34. McCoRMICK, supra note 28, at 23 n.14.
35. See cases collected in 32 C.J.S. Evidence §§ 448-49 (1964).
36. 3 WiGMoRE, supra note 16, §§ 1918-19.
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inferences as the judge finds (a) may be rationally based on the
perception of the witness (b) and are helpful to a clear understand-
ing of his testimony or to a determination of the fact in issue ....
... (4) testimony in the form of opinions or inferences otherwise
admissible ... is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate
issue or issues to be decided by the trier of fact .... 3
The Model Code of Evidence also suggests a relaxation of the tradition-
ally accepted rule against opinions by its provision that the court, in its
discretion, may admit into evidence certain opinion or inference testi-
mony "where the facts in controversy are incapable of being detailed so
as to give the jury an intelligent understanding thereof. ' 38 Federal Rule
of Evidence 701, dealing with lay opinion testimony, clearly favors the
liberal approach. It is formulated verbatim as the value test contained
above in uniform rule 56(1).
The Advisory Committee's note to federal rule 701 suggests the hope
that the practical problems arising from the varied standards presently
applied by courts in determining admissibility of an opinion will be
obviated by the formulation of this rule.39 Recognizing the difficulty of
deciding admissibility as such on "necessity," "expediency," "impracti-
cality" or "convenience," the committee has formulated a liberal rule.
Admissibility is keyed only upon two prerequisites: 1) that the testifying
witness have firsthand knowledge of primary facts, based on his own
perception, and 2) that the opinion he offers be "helpful to a clear un-
derstanding of his testimony... or determination of a fact in issue. '40
The new formulation expands upon the views suggested above by the
Uniform Rules and Model Evidence Code. While the Model Evidence
Code has the identical requirements to determine admissibility-actual
sensual perceptions and probative value to the jury-it also suggests
that it is in some instances the duty of the judge to require that the at-
torney examine the witness concerning the data upon which his opinion
is founded. Uniform rule 57 provides: "The judge may require that a
witness... be first examined on the data upon which the opinion or
inference is founded. . . ." Federal rule 701 makes no explicit mention
of the necessity for establishing a foundation of "facts" for the witness's
opinion either by a discretionary duty incumbent upon the judge or a
37. UNIFORM RuLs OF EVIDENCE rule 56(l)(b) (1943).
38. MoDEL CoDE OF EvIDENCE rule 401 (1942). See discussion in 2 E. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 80 (1954).
39. Noms OF THE ADVISORY COMMiTrEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 51 F.R.D. 402
(1971).
40. See note 22 supra.
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mandatory duty on the attorney proffering the opinion. The notes of
the Advisory Committee indicate that the safeguards of cross-examina-
tion will sufficiently guarantee the competency of opinions or inferences
offered as evidence. "The natural characteristics of the adversary system
will generally lead to an acceptable result ... since the lawyer can be
expected to display his witness to best advantage .... ,,41
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, any factually grounded opinion
may be offered into evidence if it is "helpful" to a clearer understanding
of the issues in the case. Such testimony may well have been inadmissible
under the traditional rule against opinions as followed in many states.
This federal standard can theoretically be expanded to admit opinions
as to whether another party knew or did not know a particular fact
regarding the defective product, or whether the injured party volun-
tarily assumed a risk or was contributorily negligent. The witness seem-
ingly may offer his opinion on "unreasonableness," "safety," "danger"
and a number of 'legal' concepts as long as he meets the requirement
that his opinion is "helpful" to the resolution of the case and is ration-
ally based. No distinction is laid by the rule as to whether lay opinions
on "ultimate" fact are equally as acceptable as ones on "evidentiary"
fact. No exclusion is suggested for opinions which touch questions of
law or opinions based in some part on inferences or opinions of another
not a witness, ordinarily inadmissible as hearsay.
Federal rule 701 relies on the innate checks and balances of the ad-
versary system to refine and delineate opinion evidence offered at a trial.
Product liability trials already present to the jury a network of expert
opinion evidence whose relationships to one another strain both coun-
sel's cross-examination capabilities and the jury's comprehension. Intro-
ducing into that network yet another set of opinions, lay opinions, with
correlative duties upon the jury to assimilate the information and upon
counsel to elucidate where and how it fits, may well create an additional
burden within an already-burdened system. Cross-examination in gen-
eral civil trials has proven to be a valuable check on one's adversary's
temptation to put in evidence that which may have little absolute pro-
bative value. The nature of cross-examination in a products trial, how-
ever, requires substantially more preparation (even operating under the
present federal limited-admissibility system) by counsel in order that
he be able to adequately attack or impeach the complex scientific testi-
mony presented on direct. Cross-examination in products trials seems an
41. 51 F.R.D. at 402.
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inadequate and overworked vehicle for the additional task of policing
lay opinion testimony assigned to it by federal rule 701.
In addition to allocating the burden of policing to cross-examination
within the products trial, rule 701 seems to take away the power of the
judge to require a definitive factual foundation for lay opinion testi-
mony. Uniform rule 58 placed an affirmative duty upon the trial judge
to elicit the facts surrounding and supporting an opinion before testi-
mony is given. Such a provision is conspicuously absent from any of the
federal rules. Perhaps the discretionary capabilities of the judge may
nevertheless be inferred from the language of federal rule 701, which
specifies that a witness's opinion be "rationally based on perception."
But the failure of rule 701 to specifically require a judicial exercise of
discretion in those cases where lay opinions may be offered surely mul-
tiplies the possibilities of incompetent opinion being admitted into
evidence.
The ills of assigning to cross-examination the responsibility for exam-
ining the foundation for opinion testimony are aggravated by a system
wherein the judge has no explicit discretionary power. Cross-examina-
tion is not an "all-sufficient substitute for requiring the proponent to
elicit his testimony by specific questions . . . . The impression from the
general description or inference has already been made by (direct)
examination .... Every trial lawyer is slow to cross-examine unless he
has reason to hope for helpful answers, which he seldom does. The
professional habit of inquiry into the concrete particulars of the prin-
cipal facts will probably be much weakened if the power of the trial
judge to require it to be taken away .... ,,42 The failure of rule 701 to
vest the judge with such "explicit discretionary power" over the nature
of opinions offered and its reliance on cross-examination alone for super-
vision will do little to improve the quality of opinion in the products
liability trial.
C. Testimony by Experts: Federal Rule 702
The classical standards for the use of expert testimony in a trial were
twofold: the subject to which the expert was addressing his expertise
must have been beyond the understanding of the average layman, 43 and
42. KING & PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENcE IN ILLINOIS 10 (1942), cited in MCCORMICK,
supra note 28, § 12, at 26 n.37.
43. JONES, supra note 31, § 1312; 31 AM. JUR. 2d Expert and Opinion Testimony (1967);
7 DEc. DIG. EVID. §§ 505-34 (1968).
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the expert himself had had such specialized training, experience, or
education 44 that his inferences on the facts would aid the jury to under-
stand the issues. The decision as to whether the subject was beyond "lay
comprehension," such that the expert's testimony was required on a
given topic, was one made by counsel in the early stages of the law suit.
The judgment that a particular expert proffered by counsel was compe-
tent to testify on a given issue in the case was generally an ad hoc one,
rendered by the trial judge at or before the time the expert witness was
offered.45 After the witness had been accepted, of course, the above
standards could be discretionarily applied by a trial judge to limit the
nature and scope of the expert's testimony.
Federal rule 702 combines the classical standards into one liberalized
one:
.. . if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.48
This formulation preserves the traditional qualification that the ex-
pert must be one qualified by particular skills, training or education to
give testimony on the issue. A witness may be an expert by virtue of any
one of a number of things: trade, skill, on-the-job training, research
work or formal education. In this respect, the new rule liberalizes the
scope of who may testify in an expert capacity.47 Paratechnical areas such
as banking, education, and farming are clearly included in areas of
expertise.
The subject matter to be testified to by the expert in concomitantly
more broadly phased under rule 702. Instead of "scientific or technical"
topics only, the expert may testify in any area of "specialized" knowl-
edge. The attorney thus is free to structure his case utilizing extensive
expert testimony in such specialized areas under the proposed rules of
evidence.
44. 7 WiGMom, supra note 16, § 1923; 7 DEC DiG. CRIM. §§ 477-81 (1968); 7 DEC. DIG. EvID.
§§ 537-46 (1968); 32 C.J.S. Evidence §§ 456-58 (1964).
45. Cf. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414 (1942); McCoid, Opinion Evidence
and Expert Witnesses, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 356, 366 (1955).
The author of this article gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Aaron Twerski
and Abraham Ordover of the Hofstra University Law Faculty,
46. See note 22 supra.
47. The practical advantages of characterizing a witness as an expert include his being
allowed to testify as to his inferences upon the facts (rather than merely reciting those
facts himself as a lay witness would), his competency to testify regardless of a lack of first
hand knowledge, and his ability to give an opinion on "ultimate issues."
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The liberalization by new rule 702 thus modifies both the nature of
the subject matter and the nature of the restrictions formerly placed
on the one seeking to testify. In addition, the standards for determining
when expert testimony is to be used have been relaxed. Rather than the
topic's being "beyond lay comprehension," under the new rule the topic
to which the expert addresses himself need only be "helpful" to the trier
of fact. The expert's testimony can be utilized in any areas where his
opinion would "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
determine a fact in issue."
Numerous times, in products liability trials especially, juries are asked
to examine fact situations which, although not totally "beyond compre-
hension," are exceedingly difficult technically. The new rule resolves
the doubt about the propriety of using an expert to explain the ele-
mentary technical aspects of a given case. Careful utilization of the
expert to aid the jury's understanding of the technological aspects of
the case is sure to improve the quality of the decision that it renders.
A recognition of the expert as an integral part of the foundation being
laid for trial48-- rather than an evidentiary stop-gap--should follow
much more easily with the role of the expert as defined by this new rule
of evidence.
A long standing criticism of the current evidentiary practice dealing
with expert testimony has been the use of hypothetical questions to
present the jury with the experts' understanding of the subject.49 The
hypothetical question is a favorite device of counsel who, for one or
another reason, cannot give the expert the opportunity to acquire the
type of firsthand observations and knowledge required to allow that
expert to testify without making hypothetical assumptions. When the
expert is unable to make an investigation of the matter at issue himself,
when the subject matter of interest to the inquiry has been altered or
becomes unavailable, the only vehicle for utilization of the expert's skill
is to have him make certain assumptions on the facts on the record and
to have him form an opinion respecting those assumptions.
There are certain basic requirements for the use of the hypothetical
question itself that attempt to preserve the accuracy of the process, such
48. This new view of the expert is one suggested by Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler &
Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 Duq. L. REv. 425
(1974).
49. General criticism of the abuses engendered by the use of a hypothetical may be found
in Cane, The Intricacies of Hypothetical Questions, 48 MAQ. L. Rxv. 850 (1965). But as is
pointed out by Busch, the hypothetical can be valuable if fairly constructed. See F. BuscH,
LAW AND TAMCrIS IN JuiY TRIALs § 392 (1949).
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as the requirement that all facts assumed in the hypothetical must be
supported by the evidence either directly or inferentially.50 But is this
requirement conversely true, that all facts of record material to the ques-
tion at issue must of necessity be included in the framing of the hypo-
thetical? One of the great disadvantages in use of the hypothetical is the
danger of conscious or subconscious shading of the issue by carefully
choosing the facts which are to be assumed. On the other hand, a hypo-
thetical which embraces all facts pertinent to the question may become
so cumbersome and complex as to destroy its utility for the jury. Yet
the hypothetical question, that "wen on the fair face of justice," is still
the primary vehicle for presenting expert testimony to the jury today.
Wigmore characterizes its problems as follows:
The hypothetical question, misused by the clumsy and abused
by the clever, has in practice led to intolerable obstruction of the
truth .... It has artificially clamped the mouth of the expert so that
his answer to a complex question may not express his actual opinion
on the case. The question may be so built up and contribed by
counsel as to represent only a partisan conclusion. In the second
place, it has tended to mislead the jury as to the purport of actual
expert opinion. This is due to the same reason. In the third place,
it has tended to confuse the jury, so that its employment becomes a
mere waste of time and a futile obstruction .... 51
Rule 702 and the following rules deemphasize the hypothetical as a
form for presenting expert testimony to the jury by specifically provid-
ing that the testimony may be by opinion "or otherwise," without enu-
merating the hypothetical per se in the recommended methods. The
notes of the Advisory Committee to rule 702 suggest that this part of
the rule was formulated in that manner "to recognize that an expert
may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles
relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply (those principles)
to the facts."' 52 When the jury can itself draw relevant inferences, coun-
sel may decide to use the expert in a non-opinion, expository function.
Opinions and hypotheticals are retained by this rule at the discretion of
counsel, but the emphasis has shifted to the use of the expert to lay a
technical foundation in order to enhance the jury's understanding of
the matter at issue. If necessary, the expert can both explain the facts
50. I. GOLDsrEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUES § 18.01 (1969); Note, Expert Witness and the Hy-
pothetical Question, 13 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 755 (1962).
51. See 2 WitMoRE, supra note 16, § 686.
52. See note 22 supra.
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and draw the inferences which the jury might be, in certain instances,
unable to draw for itself for lack of the requisite technical background.
The suggestion in rule 702 that the expert give an exposition or disser-
tation fits well with the notion that the technical expert should explain
not merely his scientific conclusions but also the thought processes which
led him to those conclusions." When the hypothetical question is the
means employed by counsel to summarize the decision of the expert on
a given issue, all possible insight by the jury as to why that particular
decision was reached is lost. The hypothetical itself assumes the 100
per cent probability level for all the assumed facts and disregards those
not included completely; the conclusion drawn therefrom is an all-or-
nothing one that refuses to consider any deviation from the agreed-upon,
assumed facts.54 The experts' opinions would be much more valuable if
each expert were to explain his decision process step-by-step, telling the
jury why he accepted certain facts as crucial and relevant to his theory
and disregarded others, using the form of an informal lecture rather
than the stilted hypothetical. The suggested lecture technique embodied
in rule 702 clearly supports the new role of the technical expert as an
advisor and assistant to the jury's fact finding process rather than an
oracle whose thought processes were inscrutable but whose findings were
based on 100 per cent certainty.
D. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts: Rule 703
The expert witness contributes to the fact finding process not only
the sort of factual observations a lay witness might relay but also the
technical or scientific conclusions he has formed by drawing on his own
particular reserve of expertise or experience."' Accordingly, the ordinary
requirement that a witness seeking to testify have "firsthand" knowl-
edge of the matter is modified in the case of one who testifies as an expert
in any of several ways. The data which form the basis for the expert's
opinion need not be itself introduced into evidence in some jurisdic-
53. Such expanded explanation is equally valuable in the testimony of other experts
also. Cf. Iadd, Expert and Other Opinion Testimony, 40 MINN. L. REV. 437 (1956);
Louisell & Diamond, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and
Speculations, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1330 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Louisell]; Note, Medical
Causation Testimony: Possibility vs. Probability, 23 Sw. L.J. 622 (1969).
54. See critique in Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interac-
tion of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. Rav. 425 (1974).
55. See generally Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Concerning Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1901); Maguire & Hahesy, Requisite Proof of Basis for
Expert Opinion, 5 VAND. L. Rav. 432 (1952).
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tions, although a division of the authorities exists on the question.56 The
expert's opinion may be founded upon the testimony of other witnesses
. called by counsel while the expert is present in the courtroom. The
expert often relies upon technical information available within his
profession, such as textbooks, seminars, and professional and research
publications, to influence if not define his opinion. To what extent are
such outside sources allowed to be relied upon by the expert without
their being admitted into evidence?
Traditionally, the expert witness is expected to specify the data upon
which his conclusions are founded.57 The purpose of such a requirement
has been said to be to give the jury a full picture by presenting both the
conclusions and the premises upon which the conclusions rest. If a
professional has cause to utilize the reports of others in formulating his
own opinion, the prevailing view insists that such use is improper and
subject to the hearsay or want of personal knowledge objections. Any
opinion based partly on the reports, opinions, or findings, written or
otherwise, of parties not before the court for cross-examination is sub-
ject to such objection. This is the rule in a majority of states, but there
have been many practical criticisms of the rule.59 Illustrating this point,
McCormick points out that a physician is often called to give his opinion
although his findings are based not on personal knowledge but on hos-
pital records, reports and charts, diagnoses and reports of attending
physicians, and relevant medical literature conventionally relied on in
the field. 0 The expert in his own professional area of expertise would
seem to be the one consummately capable of judging the relevancy and
reliability of any such extraneous sources relative to his own diagnosis.
In the majority of states, no reference can be made to technical or scien-
tific out-of-court documentation although the expert, in keeping with
accepted practice, has colored his opinion by some degree of reliance
upon such sources. In some instances, the opinion so influenced may be
rejected in its entirety. The minority rule would permit reference to
be made to such extrajudicial professional information if, in the judg-
56. See generally MCCoRMICK, supra note 28, §§ 14-15; 7 WIGMORE, supra note 16,
§ 1929; UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rules 56, 57 (1943); cases noted in Annot., 98 A.L.R.
1109 (1935).
57. 2 WicMoRE, supra note 16, § 681; cases noted in Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1460 (1933);
McCOl.McK, supra note 28, § 14.
58. See Louisell, supra note 53; Rheingold, The Basis of Medical Testimony, 15 VMID.
L REv. 473, 480 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Rheingold].
59. 7 DEC. Di. EvmD. § 555 (1968); Annot., 98 A.L.R. 1109, 1112 (1935).
60. McCopMicK, supra note 28, at 32; see also Note, Admissibility of Psychiatric Testi-
mony, 53 IOWA I REv. 1287 (1967).
567
Duquesne Law Review
ment of the expert whose opinion they influence, they are relevant,
reliable and valuable.
Federal rule 703 in practice adopts the minority view on what evi-
dence may be used as a basis for the experts' opinion. It provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing if of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject. The facts or data need not be admissible. 61
The practice comment62 to rule 703 analyzes its impact as follows:
Rule 703 seems to provide that an opinion may be given in re-
sponse to 1) a hypothetical question given to the expert by the
attorney in open court, 2) similar material put to him beforehand,
3) personal otservation... 4) material he has heard from the wit-
nesses by attending the trial ....
Hence, the new rule adds to the traditionally accepted bases for expert
opinions (the in-court hypothetical and firsthand knowledge) the mi-
nority practices of beforehand briefing by the attorney and facts devel-
oped by other witnesses. The addition of these latter two bases for the
expert's opinion is particularly valuable to the attorney who is trying
a products liability case. His expert will be permitted to bolster his
opinion on the particular facts by relating his opinion not only to his
own firsthand investigations but also to the presentations and reports of
preceding witnesses. The attorney then may choose to use the hypo-
thetical question to place all the relevant facts together with the scien-
tific opinion before the jury. The flexibility of presentation allowed by
giving the expert any combination of four bases for his opinion can be
utilized by counsel to greatly improve the jury's appreciation of the
technical issues in the case.
In addition to making a wider range of input available as a basis for
the expert's opinion, the new rule provides that not all information
relied upon need be admissible in evidence under certain circumstances.
In taking this view, the drafters have sided with prominent commen-
tators in the field of evidence (including Wignore and McCormick).
An agreement with McCormick's long standing criticism of the require-
ment that the expert's data must be admissible before he can rely on it
61. 51 F.R.D. at 404.
62. J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTC, TEMPORARY PAMPHLET, PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE 104 (1973).
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as a basis for his opinion in court is vindicated by the rule. The rule
provides that if the "facts or data" are of a sort "reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field" 63 they need not be admissible. The
expert may thus utilize such facts or data to formulate or substantiate
his opinion without the worry that his opinion will be rejected in part
as founded on hearsay or for lack of firsthand knowledge. The opinion
of the medical doctor who relies not only on his own professional judg-
ment but also on existing reports and opinions of other doctors, results
of hospital laboratory tests (although not conducted by him), and medi-
cal journals and treatises is the clearest example of the expert qualifying
under this section of the rule. His opinion, founded on sources he surely
considers reliable and relevant, will not be subject to attack on the
premise that all those sources upon which he relied are not admissible
because they are in fact "reasonably relied upon by members of the
profession." The metallurgist who gives the opinion that a fracture is
not a fatigue fracture due to a lack of "beach marks" on the fracture
surface is relying partly on his own expertise and partly on statistical
evaluations and metal-failure experiments correlating fatigue failures
with beach marks on the fracture surface as published in various jour-
nals by other professionals. In areas of science where the hypothesis
remains to be conclusively proven, it is mandatory that a scientist be
permitted to make his own evaluation of the ongoing research data and
relate it to the opinion he presents at trial. McCormick notes that the
expert, in his own area of expertise, is the one most qualified to judge
the accuracy and relevance of the extra judicial data he relies on to
support his hypothesis.64 The expert's own sense of professionalism and
the objective "reasonability" requirement within the rule seem to safe-
guard the quality of the out-of-court sources on which the expert opin-
ion may be founded.
We note that the formulation of rule 703 only disqualifies attempts
to exclude the opinion which is founded on extrajudicial sources. The
admission of the reports or treatises themselves into evidence depends,
as before, upon the application of the standard rules of admissibility.
Counsel who choose to offer the opinion without introducing into evi-
dence the sources upon which it is based may engender a lack credibility
in the jury's mind which decreases the impact the opinion might have
had. The practical problems of using extrajudicial, inadmissible sources
63. 51 F.R.D. at 404.
64. MCCORMICK, supra note 28, § 15.
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as bases for the now-admissible expert opinion are not obviated by the
new rule.
E. Rule 704: Opinion on Ultimate Issue
In accord with the old notions of providing the jury with a clear
picture of the facts of a given case, witnesses were prohibited from ex-
pressing any opinions on the ultimate issues of the case.0 5 "Ultimate"
issues, upon which the very outcome of the lawsuit depended, were to
be resolved by the jury's own analysis of the supportive facts, uncoloured
by the beliefs or conclusions of the witnesses. Thus, proffered opinions
on ultimate issues such as negligence, guilt, testamentary capacity, cause
of a medical condition, or probable cause have been disallowed. Such
an opinion, whose formulation necessarily implies an analysis of the
relevant law in addition to observed facts, is held to be completely out-
side the legal domain of a witness. On such a question the court instructs
the jury members as to the law, and the decision of the ultimate issues
in the case is resolved by them according to their own judgment on the
facts in light of that law.
As the complexity of the subject matter of the suit increases, it is more
likely than not that witnesses of necessity formulate opinions involving
the ultimate facts of the case. Particularly with expert witnesses, the
trend has been to allow opinion testimony on the ultimate issues due to
the value of such testimony in light of the difficult technical issues which
the jury is expected to handle. The expert's opinions embracing the
"ultimate facts" are often necessary to the best determination by the
jury of the issues of the law suit.
The absolute bar against opinions embracing ultimate facts has been
abandoned by many courts who allow the opinions whenever they are
of appreciable aid to the jury in reaching the right conclusion. This is
the view advocated by both McCormick and Wigmore66 in their com-
mentaries on evidence. In addition, the Model Code of Evidence prom-
ulgated by the American Law Institute abrogates the bar of opinions
on ultimate facts in light of the informative value of the expert's opin-
ion to the jury: "An expert witness may state his relevant inferences,
whether or not such inferences embrace an ultimate issue to be decided
65. See generally Rheingold, supra note 58.
66. McCoitmim, supra note 28, § 12, at 27; 7 WiMmoRE, supra note 16, § 1920.
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by the trier of fact. '' 67 This is also the view of the drafters of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence:
Testimony in the form of opinions or inferences otherwise ad-
missible under these rules is not objectionable because it embraces
the ultimate issue or issues to be decided by the trier of fact.68
The Federal Rules of Evidence follow the viewpoint of the latter
authorities in removing the previously existing bar to admissibility of
opinions on the ultimate issues of the case. Rule 704 provides:
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise ad-
missible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact.
The notes of the Advisory Committee69 on rule 704 suggest that the
new rule is in keeping with the liberal approach of admitting expert
opinions when 'helpful' to the trier of fact. The Advisory Committee
accepts as one of its bases for this viewpoint the criticisms of the com-
mentators regarding the difficulties of excluding such opinions from the
jury's consideration. The new rule specifically abolishes the "ultimate
issue" aspect of the rule against opinions discussed at length in section
701 and 702. "The old rule was unduly restrictive, difficult of applica-
tion, and generally served only to deprive the trier of fact of useful
information." 70
In the area of products litigation, cases often turn upon a resolution
of complex technical fact situations. The experts' opinions as to whether
a failure was a fatigue failure, whether a piece of machinery was de-
signed with too low a tolerance, or whether a construction trench was
properly constructed all embrace "ultimate issues," but due to the so-
phisticated nature of the fact questions and the value to the jury of the
expert's conclusions, such opinions have regularly been admitted. Fed-
eral rule 704, removing the bar to opinions on ultimate issues, should
have little effect on current products liability trial practice involving
expert witnesses in this regard.
The language of rule 704 does not, however, concur with existing
legal thought that the opinion of a lay witness on the ultimate issue
should continue to be inadmissible. More valid objections can be raised
67. MODEL CODE OF EviDENC E rule 401 (1942).
68. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 56 (4) (1943).




against the testimony of the lay witness containing such an opinion than
against the expert's, who brings to the formulation of his opinion a skill
or expertise outside the range of the lay juryman. The old complaint
that an opinion on ultimate facts "usurps the province" of the jury is
particularly true when the opinion is proffered by a lay witness no more
qualified than the jury to draw such conclusions.
Under rule 704, opinions on ultimate issues, whether they be formu-
lated by laymen or experts, still must meet the requirements of the other
federal rules. Under rules 701 and 702, both expert and lay opinions
must be helpful to the jury's fact finding determination or understand-
ing of the evidence, with the trial judge retaining ultimate discretion
about the utility of any opinion proffered. The combined requirements
of rules 701, 702, and 704 provide adequate safeguard against the spectre
of wholesale admissibility of opinions to the detriment of the fact finding
process.
F. Rule 705: Disclosure of Facts or Data
Underlying Expert Opinion
The lay witness is ordinarily qualified to testify because of observa-
tions and firsthand knowledge of transactions relevant to the case. The
expert, on the other hand, offers not only his observations but also a
specialized, skilled analysis thereof, based upon a relevant science or
expertise. His opinion, as we have seen, is admissible. What of the
sources of information he uses to formulate his opinion-must they be
offered by counsel to substantiate the opinion? Should it remain for
opposing counsel to question the formulation of the expert's opinion
on cross? What is to be done when that information upon which the
expert has relied is itself hearsay or otherwise inadmissible into evi-
dence?
Before the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts were divided on
whether the data used by the expert in formulating his opinion should
be brought out at trial. Some courts demanded that the expert specify,
on direct, the sources he used.71 A contrary view assumes the credibility
of the opinion without requiring sources; it then becomes the duty of
the cross-examiner to elicit the sources for the opinion and then proceed
to attack its validity. The middle ground leaves it to the court's discre-
tion to require such sources if needed.
71. Raub v. Carpenter, 187 US. 159 (1902); see cases noted Annot., 82 A.L.R. 1338,
1342 (1933); 31 Am. JUR. Expert and Opinion Evidence § 27 (1967).
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In certain fact situations the information on which the expert is partly
relying is itself inadmissible, such as the situations where a scientist
makes a judgment based on data gathered by others not present to
testify to selection methods, or where a psychiatrist formulates an
opinion from hearsay information provided by a patient's family and
friends.72 These conditions pose real problems in jurisdictions where
the expert is commanded to specify on direct his bases for the opinion.
The prevailing view, if the opinion is founded in major part on inad-
missible bases, is to disallow the opinion in its entirety for lack of foun-
dation (the "want of knowledge" objection to admissibility).
Rheingold's and McCormick's criticisms of this harsh rule of disallow-
ing the opinion in toto are taken into account by the new rule. The
suggestions of the Model Expert Testimony Act are also incorporated
into rule 705 as follows:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts on
data, unless the judge requires otherwise. The expert may in any
event be required to disclose the underlying facts on data on cross-
examination. 7
The new rule radically shifts the burden in some jurisdictions of ad-
vancing the bases for the expert's testimony from the proponent to the
cross-examiner. It retains the judicial discretion prevalent in the middle-
ground jurisdictions; presumably the judge can request that the data be
elicited from the expert either on cross or on direct. The permissive
formulation of the rule ("the expert may .... "), the Advisory Commit-
tee notes, "allows counsel to make disclosure of the underlying facts or
data if he chooses.., the instances in which he is required to do so are
reduced." 74
The formulation of the rule follows the modern trend in many juris-
dictions of permitting the expert wide latitude in gathering input for
his eventual trial opinion. In several fields, particularly the medical field,
the practice of experts has been to base opinions on many sources, both
admissible and inadmissible: personal observation and diagnoses, lab
reports, consultation reports of other physicians, "hearsay" commen-
taries from lay witnesses to the accident or treatment, reports of ac-
quaintances or paid investigators.7 5 Modern federal practice will now
72. Cf. Louisell, supra note 52; Rheingold, supra note 58.
73. 51 F.R.D. at 406.
74. See note 69 supra.
75. See the extensive discussions in notes 49 & 53 supra.
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recognize those opinions, bringing evidence practice into accord with
the policy of experts themselves in formulating their opinions by using
a variety of valuable though hitherto-inadmissible sources.
Rule 705 fails to draw one very necessary distinction in the area of
admitting opinions based on out-of-court sources. It does not specify
whether the "data relied upon" (previously inadmissible under the rules
of evidence) is now admissible under rule 705 or whether rule 705 only
serves to make admissible the opinion founded thereon. Since the pre-
vious practice was to bar the opinion totally, at the very least rule 705
revises practice to guarantee the admissibility of the opinion itself. But
what of the situation where the opinion, clearly valuable to the fact
finding function of the jury and formulated with professional care by a
conscientious expert, relies on hearsay to a substantial degree and the
judge in his discretion decides to require disclosure of such underlying
facts? Is rule 705 now a vehicle for admissibility of not only the opinion
but also its basis? Rule 705 is at an impasse with itself in such a situation;
the notes of the Advisory Committee offer no advice on such question.
Presumably, a trial judge operating in the wide latitude of judicial dis-
cretion could not "require" disclosure in open court of evidence inad-
missible under the rules of evidence, even though it seems advisable to
elicit the bases for the experts' opinion.
G. Federal Rule 706: Court-Appointed Experts
Traditionally, in the Anglo-American legal system the responsibility
for developing the theories of the case rested on counsel and not the
court itself. Designation of witnesses and development of the facts were
adversary processes, wherein each side marshalled its evidence with the
objective of proving its case in the trial arena.
The literature to date suggests that the most prevalent justification
for a trial judge's interference in the above process was an incomplete-
ness or inaccuracy in the presentation of relevant information by the
party.7 6 It has been suggested that in such a circumstance the judge has
not only the right but also the affirmative duty to elicit the missing in-
formation.7 7 He may do so by any of the following means: 1) he may
76. 3 WIGMoRE, supra note 28, § 784.
77. The judge's responsibility to control the trial extends to calling witnesses in the
interest of justice; his failure to do so may constitute reversible error. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 27, at 12 nn. 13 & 14. Contra, 9 WiGMoRE, supra note 28, § 2484, at 267, holding
that such discretionary power does not constitute the affirmative duty implied above.
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discretionarily examine any witness called by a party to bring out facts
not made apparent by the calling party on direct; 2) he may cross-exam-
ine any witness, with the purpose of impeaching, contradicting, or dis-
crediting his prior testimony;"' 3) he may call, upon his own motion, a
witness not listed by either party in order that the jury be supplied with
information deemed necessary but hitherto unavailable from the testi-
monies of those already called.7 9
Assuming that in certain exceptional circumstances the active inter-
vention of the trial judge in calling a new witness is recommended in
the interests of justice, what substantive law supports his rights to so
intervene? The innate power of a trial judge to call his own witness is a
decided question, with the only problems lying in the extent and man-
ner whereby such power is to be exercised and the degree to which the
expert chosen should participate at trial. In some jurisdictions, experts
have been utilized merely as examiners and reporters without being
permitted to offer testimony at trial. State statutes may limit the use of
court experts to criminal matters only, scientific matters only, or, con-
versely, on any question of fact or opinion in any type of case, criminal
or civil. The Committee of the American Bar Association on Improve-
ments in the Law of Evidence proposed in 1938 that the suggestion of
the Model Expert Testimony Act s be adopted. The Act provided for
appointment of an expert, by the court of its own motion in addition
to ones chosen by the parties in any case, civil or criminal, regardless
of the subject matter. Similarly, the Uniform Rules of Evidence provide
for appointment of experts by the court sua sponte if their appointment,
in the court's opinion, is "desirable."8' The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, by rule 28, provide for the court-appointed expert in crim-
inal cases, but no parallel provision exists in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.8 2 Federal rule 706, entitled "Court-appointed Experts," as-
78. In a majority of jurisdictions, there is a prohibition against the judge's commenting
on the proceedings before him such that he himself assumes the role of a prosecutor or
adversary. The judge who chooses to cross-examine must therefore refrain from leading
the witness or examining in such a partisan manner as to disclose to the jury his own in-
ferences on the matters to which the witness is addressing himself.
79. 2 WIGMost, supra note 16, § 563; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 16, § 2484; see cases noted
95 A.L.R. 2d 383 (1964). See Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own
Expert Witnesses, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 195 (1956). Indeed, 'expert' witnesses were originally re-
garded as amid curiae to be called by the court rather than partisan witnesses to be uti-
lized by the adversaries. Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony,
2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 406, 411 (1935).
80. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, MODEL ExPERT
TESTIMONY ACT §§ 1-10, 339-48 (Handbook, 1937).
81. UNIFORM RULEs OF EVIDENcE rule 59 (1953).
82. The Judicial Conference had considered and rejected a proposal to enlarge the
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similates many of the provisions suggested by the Model Expert Testi-
mony Act and the Uniform Rules of Evidence. It provides:
(a) ... the judge may appoint any expert witness agreed upon by
the parties and may appoint witnesses of his own selection ....
A witness so appointed... may be called to testify .... He shall
be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party
calling him as a witness .... 83
The rule clearly does not limit the appointment of experts to criminal
or scientifically-complex cases only, as some of the statutes and current
federal practice had done. The court-appointed expert under rule 706
has the same testimonial privileges as the party-called expert, such as
deposition testimony and direct-examination by any party who wishes
to call him. In addition, the court-appointed expert is presumably sub-
ject to either a direct or cross-examination by the party who has called
him, as well as the traditional cross-examination by the adversary.84
Such combination examination is in keeping with the role of the court-
appointed expert as an intermediary who serves to mediate the scientific
dispute between opposing counsels' experts and provide, at least theo-
retically, a more impartial view than either adversary expert, but who
at the same time may be propounding a theory at odds with both
theories and fairly susceptible to technical challenge.
In products liability practice, the use of a court-appointed expert to
mediate the dispute between opposing experts offers great possibilities
for improvement of the very nature of the technical testimony offered
at trial. The bias of the expert called by the parties is altogether too
obvious in many circumstances, such as the situation where the defen-
dant is a manufacturer on trial for an alleged defective design and his
expert witness is the engineer within whose job responsibility falls the
power of the judge in federal civil actions to call his own expert who would be paid out of
public funds rather than by the parties, similar to the provisions of rule 28. REPORT OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDIcL CONFERENCE 23, 24 (1955).
83. 51 F.R.D. at 407.
84. Traditionally one who calls a witness as his own vouches for the veracity and
credibility of that which is testified to by him. Hence the rule has long existed prohibiting
any cross-examination of one's own witness (except in the unusual case of "surprise.') In
the situation arising under rule 706, the court-appointed expert will of necessity be called
by one or the other party in order to give the court and jury the benefit of his expertise.
Since the court expert's opinion may not be entirely favorable to the calling party (and
indeed as his position is that of a neutral intermediary this is likely), it seems just and
indeed mandatory to allow the calling party the prerogative both to elicit testimony in the
nature of direct and to then proceed to invesigate, in the manner of cross, those aspects of
the court-appointed expert's testimony which contradict or weaken the opinions of one's
own expert previously called. The exact mechanism whereby the above should be ac-
complished at trial is not specified by the rule, although it seems clear that the examina-
tion of the court-appointed expert must not be solely a cross-examination by the parties.
576
Vol. 12: 551, 1974
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
formulation of the original specifications in question and who also
happens to be currently in defendant's employ in a like capacity. Nor
is the plaintiff's expert free from the taint of bias, for plaintiff's attorney
may have indulged in extensive expert-shopping to get a witness willing
to lend scientific credence to a theory of liability which is at best highly
suspect if examined with scientific objectivity. It is in such an arena,
where biased experts are used to further the lego-technical aims for
which they were hired without regard for the basic tenents of the pro-
fession within which they practice, that the court-appointed expert can
make the strongest contribution to an improvement of the quality of
expert testimony presented. His very presence has a cautionary impact
on the expert for hire whose theories at trial are now subject to dispute
not only by an adversary expert but also by a neutral court-appointed
one.
What of the charge, sure to be leveled by trial counsel, that to utilize
a court-chosen expert in addition to experts chosen by the adversaries
casts doubt upon the latters' judgments? Certainly the fact that a certain
expert had been retained at the suggestion of the court has the potential
of greater import being given to his testimony by the jury, even to the
total abandonment by them of any contra theory advanced by counsel's
expert. Rule 706(c) provides a safeguard against such occurrences, how-
ever, by providing that the revelation of the court appointment of an
expert is entirely discretionary with the trial judge. In the situation
where the disclosure of the expert's status might significantly colour
the jury's ultimate determination on competing scientific theories,
hopefully the judge may well choose to keep that status unrevealed. And
the provision in the rule that the court-appointed expert may be called
by any party and be subject to both direct and cross does not of itself
reveal to the jury that this particular expert is one whom the court has
chosen.
There is one problem with the use of the court-appointed expert not
adequately dealt with by the new rule, and that is one which arises
when such expert is called in upon a question which is undeniably
controversial within his own profession. For example, in the field of
metallurgy there is considerable debate over the question of whether
the absence of certain "beachmarks" on a fracture surface conclusively
indicates an impact failure. Authority is cited to the effect that all
fatigue failures show such beachmarks, therefore, if none exist the mode
of failure is not fatigue. Contra is the hypothesis that a failure surface
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without markings could exist even though the mode of failure was
fatigue but no markings are visible because the electron microscopy
techniques whereby the markings are discoverable are simply not
sophisticated enough to find them. One adversary's expert espouses the
former theory and his opponent's expert the latter. Due to the existence
of a legitimate division of scientific opinion on the question, the jury
ordinarily would weigh the two theories and arrive at what seems to
be the most practical conclusion on the facts. But if we inject into this
scenario a third expert, the court-appointed one, the strength of his
alignment on either side of the dispute before the jury may determine
ultimately which side prevails, perhaps only due to the numerical ad-
vantage thus created for that side. It seems unfair to give such an advan-
tage to any one side by injecting the court-appointed expert when the
technology itself recognizes two widely disparate and equally scientifi-
cally-supportable approaches. Perhaps before the court utilizes its dis-
cretionary power to appoint an expert it should analyze the issues to
which that expertise will be addressed in order to ascertain if the area
involves legitimate technical disaccord, and if so, consider the appoint-
ment of not one but a number of its own experts to fairly represent
both of the contradictory views.
A long discussed question appurtent to the use of court-appointed
experts is the practical one of who shall pay his fee. Expert witnesses,
due to the nature of their expertise, command significantly higher rates
than the lay witness whose allotment is fixed by the rules of court.
Indeed, the ability of the judge to call an expert is worth little unless
there exists a mechanism whereby the expert is assured fair compensa-
tion for his services. It had once been proposed to pay the witness out of
special public funds to be provided by law.85 As no federal law existed
providing for expert compensation in excess of normal lay witness fees,
case law at that time had worked no solution to the dilemma of the
expert's fee, except the alternatives of assessment as a court cost of the
suit after trial or payment at the time of testimony by equal contribu-
tion of the adversary parties. s6
85. See note 81 supra.
86. The problem of who shall pay the expert's fee was taken all the way to the Supreme
Court in Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O.R.R., 284 U.S. 444 (1932). There, the victorious
plaintiff at the trial court level wanted to have his own expert-witness fees paid by the
losing defendant. The Court noted that the award of fees in excess of the normal lay-witness
fees authorized by rules of court must of necessity find a similar authorization in existing
federal law which then (and now) did not exist. The opinion contains a thorough survey
of the various mechanisms whereby the payment of the expert's fees in excess of those
awarded to lay witnesses might be accomplishd, among them an assessment against the
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Both the Model Expert Testimony Act and rule 60 of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence suggest contribution by both parties as the means of
meeting the expert's bill. This is the provision of federal rule 706 in
esse, with the added directive to the judge that the assessments against
the parties may be "in such proportion and at such time as the judge
directs," and "thereafter to be charged in the manner as other costs."
By inference, the entire cost of hiring the court's expert might be borne
by the party who ultimately loses the lawsuit, in addition to the normal
court costs, but that added financial burden diminishes in importance
when one recognizes that the conscientious use of the court-appointed
expert as suggested by rule 706 presents the possibilities for increased
jury understanding and unbiased presentation of technological issues.
CONCLUSION
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence go far to correct the "un-
worthy state of Federal Evidence practice ' 87 extant throughout the last
seventy years. The rules attempt to provide an organized framework
within which federal courts can operate in evidentiary matters to give
to federal evidence practice across the circuits that uniformity and
consistency so long unattained. Article VII of the rules, dealing with
expert and opinion testimony, lays to rest many of the fossils of evi-
dence law which served more to impede than to augment the fact finding
process, such as the bar to lay opinions, the rule against testimony on the
ultimate issues, and the restricted-scope cross-examination. Article VII
accords to the expert witness the recognition due him as an integral and
important building block in the foundation the attorney lays for trial,
and suggests for such a witness an educational role far superior in light
of utilization of his expertise and clarification of the technical issues for
the jury to the adversarial position currently employed. The changes
advocated to federal evidence practice under the proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence will go a long way towards attaining a trial system wherein
at all levels "the truth may be ascertained ... and proceedings justly
determined."8 8
litigants, and notes that the practical problem of who shall pay the expert's fee must
certainly be answered presuming the court to have power to call an expert as a witness.
The amendment proposed in rule 706, assessing the costs of the court-appointed expert
against the parties, thus fulfills the requirement that an authorization be found in federal
law to support a fee in excess of the lay witness's and proposes a solution both practical
and just.
87. See Wigmore, A Critique of the Federal Court Rules Draft, 22 A.BA.J. 811 (1936).
88. PRoposED FEDERAL RuLEs OF EvWENcE rule 102 (1973).
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